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IN MEMORIAM: THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF LON
FULLER*
ALFRED S. KONEFSKY, ELIZABETH B. MENSCH AND JOHN HENRY
SCHLEGEL**
In law, as in culture generally, symbols often capture a time
and place far better than even the most perceptive essay by the
best of historians. Just as Woodstock dramatized the experience of
being young at a particular time, so the publication in 1947 of Lon
Fuller's casebook, Basic Contract Law represented the post-war
intellectual climate in the law schools far better than could any but
the longest, most tiring of essays. As the author of Law in Quest of
Itself, Fuller had established himself as a prominent, perhaps sen-
sible, critic of American Legal Realism. Therefore, his choice some
seven years later to break radically with tradition and begin a con-
tracts casebook not with formation and consideration, but with
remedies, was a powerful message that he had accepted, if only in
part, the realists' critique of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century doctrinal universe. By asking at the outset, if not quite
"whose interest legal rules serve," at least "what's at stake here,"
Fuller set in motion the process of unmasking the ideological' im-"
plications of contract law. And by emphasizing in his answer to
that question the importance of reliance and not expectation, he
implicitly lent credence to a more social, communitarian world
view, as an alternative to an existence governed simply and invisi-
bly by market values. In this important way Fuller's book came to
signify the digestion of realism in the academy. We were all realists
then.
With the publication of this fourth edition of Fuller's casebook
that symbol is gone. Where once was Hawkins v. McGee is now the
ancient question about formation and consideration-"What
promises should we enforce?"-as if the question of enforcing
* Lon L. Fuller and Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law (4th Edition) St.
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 1981, lxiii, 1076, 3 appendices, index.
** The authors teach contract law at the Law School, State University of New York at
Buffalo.
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promises were as unproblematic as getting up in the morning. As
symbols go, we suspect this one, this return to a tory past, will not
have the force of its predecessor. First, at least one other major
casebook, Knapp's, has made this change before. Second, if one
needs a metaphor for the contemporary suppression of the ques-
tion of whose interest legal rules serve and how legal doctrine both
accomplishes and masks that task of serving, the publication of
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law a few years ago is adequate,
for its blind assumption that "of course law serves the market and
it better do it well" readily captures the neoconceptualist, market
orientation of much current contract law scholarship.
Yet the passing of Fuller's idea should not go unnoticed.
Whether in fact we were all realists then need not be answered
now. What is important is that some were. Some came to under-
stand that law was not the pretty play of colored shadows on plain
white walls. Eisenberg's decision to begin with formation rather
than remedies reveals a subtle acceptance of the recent neo-for-
malist shadows as reality. We can be influenced without under-
standing where we are being led. That is what separated Lon
Fuller from most law teachers-most of the time he knew where he
was going.
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